Six months of combat operations by a powerful striking unit known as the Mobile Riverine Force have accounted for over 1,300 enemy deaths in the upper reaches of Vietnam's Mekong Delta.  The Mobile Riverine Force, combining maneuver units of the 9th Infantry Division's 2d Brigade and U.S. Naval vessels of Task Force 117, is based upon concepts and strategy developed during the Mississippi Delta Campaign of the Civil War. Modernized adaptations of land-water warfare have carried the American unit, the second riverine warfare in the nation's history, to lopsided victories over Viet Cong battalions that once considered the Mekong marshlands and waterways their prized sanctuary.

A CIVIL WAR HERITAGE

    In the fall of 1862, General Ulysses Grant packed 32,000 weary Union soldiers onto river boats and began the siege of the vital

Confederate city of Vicksburg. Using the Mississippi Delta waterways to position Navy gunboats and to transport men and equipment, the superior Northern forces penetrated the river strongholds.
     General Grant's forces teaming with Rear Admiral David Porter's Mobile Riverine Force (MRF) carried the North's offensive deep into Dixie. Fleets of armor-protected boats provided fire support and ferried troops as the Union assaulted the series of fortifications along the Mississippi.
     Thundering volleys from Naval gunboats and mortar vessels played a decisive role in the North's successful winter and spring campaign of 1862 and 1863. After the defeat of the Confederates in the battle of Port Gibson on April 30, the fortress of Vicksburg fell on July 4. River assaults also played dominant roles as key Union victories claimed Belmont, Fort Henry, and Shiloh. Riverine warfare virtually split the Confederacy in two.

Naval River Assault Boat in the Mekong Delta                                                    ^KIRK                                                                         sleek gunboats provide firepower for MRF  

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100 YEARS & 10,000 MILES

     Today, ten-thousand miles from the muddy banks of the Mississippi and a century later, U.S. Army infantrymen of the 9th Division and a companion force from the Navy's Task Force 117 are employing river tactics based upon plans of Civil War strategists. The setting for the 20th Century MRF is the Mekong Delta with its hundreds of waterways twisting from the Tibetan Plateau through fertile Vietnam rice land to the South China Sea.
     In Vietnam, General William C. Westmoreland found himself faced with essentially the same geographic obstacles that confronted General Grant during the 1860s. The need to move combat elements into the 26,000 square miles of Mekong—long an ideal sanctuary and stronghold for the Viet Cong—prompted the forming of America's second MRF.
     Borrowing from the tactical successes of the Mississippi Campaign and French experience with a Naval Assault Division during the Indo-China war, General Westmoreland modernized the concept of riverine warfare and requested the formation of such a force. The Joint Chiefs of Staff earmarked the 9th Infantry Division, then in training at Fort Riley, Kans., for Delta mission. Under the leadership of Brigadier General William B. Fulton (then Colonel Fulton), the Division's 2d Brigade was delegated to be the riverine element.

Formation of the 2nd MRF

     The River Assault Flotilla One, later to accompany the 2d Brigade into battle as part of the MRF, was commissioned on September 1, 1966, bringing to an end the century of American isolation from riverine warfare. At Coronado, Calif., the Navy, guided by Captain Wade C. Wells, started to assemble 100 vessels to house, carry, and support the 9th Division venture into the enemy's watery domain. Craft ranging from slow-moving World War II landing craft to giant barracks ships and sleek gunboats were molded into the fleet.

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Grenadier trudges through desolate Cam Son swampland in CORONADO IX

     Two auxiliary barracks ships, the only two ships of their type in the U.S. Navy, were refurbished to provide housing for units of the 2d Brigade. In addition to their berthing facilities, the USS BENEWAH and USS COLLETON feature nautical design which permits them to operate in the shallow sedimentary rivers of the Delta. To  provide facilities for two battalions of the Brigade plus supporting units, a non-self-propelled barracks ship was added to the fleet.
     For troop and crew comfort, the floating barracks are fully air-conditioned, equipped with snack bars, movie areas, and recreation facilities.
     Armored troop carriers, protected by armor plating and mounted with machine guns, cannons and grenade launchers, were obtained to provide transportation for the combat troops during missions from the floating bases to forward operational areas. Gunboats called "Monitors" and assault support patrol boats were attached to provide firepower and protection for anchored ships and for the slower troop carriers during assaults. The gunboats also serve as blocking and intercepting forces during riverine operations.

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First true riverine assault trapped the 514th Viet Cong Local Force Battalion in Cam Son Secret Zone on May 15. As the 3d and 4th Battalions, 47th Infantry closed in from the east and west, Naval patrol boats blocked water escape routes to the south. During the encounter 113 Viet Cong were killed. No longer could the enemy believe that the Mekong Delta was his sanctuary.

    Other boats provide waterborne medical aid stations, complete with decks for landing helicopter-evacuated wounded soldiers. A landing craft, repair ship and various specialized supply and repair ships round out the vessels of NTF 117.

EVOLUTION OF MRF AS
COMBAT UNIT

     Aside from top-level conferences between Brigadier General Fulton and Captains Wells, short briefings of top cadre at Ft. Riley on boat handling, and a 10-day staff school at Coronado; members of the 2d Brigade received no specialized training in riverine warfare. In fact, the vast majority of the brigade had no idea that the 2d Brigade had been selected as the riverine element of the 9th Division.
     At the outset, the two leaders met to develop operational concepts and plans for the American offensive into the network of rivers, paddies and mangroves of the Delta. Merging of the two services into an effective fighting team required careful planning and organization.
     The leaders agreed that combat in a riverine environment would be much like fighting a normal land encounter. Such warfare, they reasoned, was simply an extension of land fighting where the same ground tactics could be applied. The main difference would be in moving infantry units by boat instead of trucks or track-vehicles. Living on barracks ships would permit the force to move during the night thus ensuring that combat troops would be rested and fresh when they reached the operational

objective. Life aboard the vessels would also enable infantrymen to dry out after being shriveled for days by wet boots and mud.
     The waterways would serve as the transportation link—opening unsuspected routes of attack—for the infantrymen of the 2d Brigade. The Delta's water lifelines would lead American units to enemy strongholds hidden in nipa palm, mangrove, and jungle thickets along the rivers.

OPERATIONS UNDERWAY

     Combat units of the 2d Brigade arrived in Vietnam during early February. The land forces would begin operations and join their sister element four months later. With the sinking of a Navy minesweeper and an attack on two other ships in the Long Tau shipping channel leading to Saigon, the brigade was immediately ordered into the half land-half swamp area along the channel know as the Rung Sat Special Zone. Though not yet an active part of the MRF, Brigadier General Fulton and his men quickly adapted to operating in the mud and slime of the Rung Sa—a way of life that would accompany future Delta operations.
     During the same period artillerymen of the 9th Division were experimenting with mobile firing bases acceptable to the riverine environment. Barges became floating gun positions and the 3d Battalion, 34th Artillery prepared to support MRF operations with their 105mm howitzers.  The batteries would follow their infantry comrades along the rivers and provide fast and accurate support once their barges were secured snugly against the shore.

 

Reliable Artillerymen prepare to fire from mobile barge                                                CORDI         3d/34th provides fast, accurate support for infantrymen in the Delta

  Infantrymen struggle to cross a Delta stream
     in endless mud and water every step is a strain

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CORDI     MRF includes floating fuel supply vessels   OH-23 observation helicopter lands for fuel

     The MRF returned to the tiny wedge of Mekong Delta marshland again during early October and tallied 94 additional kills. On the morning of October 6, helicopter gunships spotted a large bunker complex hidden in a jungle area of the Cam Son and the 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry moved into the area. A total of 47 enemy were killed during the day by ground troops, artillery fire and air support. A sweep of the marshy area on the following day accounted for another 47 kills as the enemy was forced from their bunkers.

PRECEDENCE ESTABLISHED

     One thing demonstrated quickly during the CORONADO operations was that by shifting anchorage and moving troops at night, intended assault areas could be kept secret from the enemy. By the time the enemy was alerted to the presence of the attacking river unit, air-mobile blocking forces or land stationed units had hemmed him in leaving no place to run.
     The Army-Navy team continues to establish precedence and set goals for future riverine forces. By first-hand experience, the 2d Brigade has demonstrated that there is no need to have specially trained forces for this type of fighting. Any Army infantry battalion can board the Navy ships and perform in a riverine environment with no more than five hours of basic boat handling instruction. The MRF has proven this by rotating its three battalions between the floating base and Dong Tam. There was no demonstrative loss of effectiveness when the 3d/60th replaced the 4th/47th aboard the ships during mid-August.

  The MRF, with its unique team of 4,500 Army and Navy fighting men, continues to forge its modern adaptations of historic riverine warfare into the Mekong Delta region. Despite fighting an evasive and native enemy, the kill ratio remains at more that 11 to 1 in favor of the American team.

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Strung across sky, helicopters approach infantry             choppers provide aerial fire support, airlift troops and ferry supplies

MILLAIRE

     This first issue of The OCTOFOIL is devoted to the first anniversary of the Division's arrival in Vietnam. Looking back at the record, we can be proud of many accomplishments.
     From the beginning, the Division faced a succession of challenging tasks, common to all newly arrived units. Furthermore, since it was the first division after World War II to be organized from scratch for deployment directly into combat, it was watched closely to see whether it would measure up to the standards set by the older, more experienced units. There is no longer any doubt—the Division has proved itself.
     Deployment was completed without a hitch, and combat operations commenced immediately. Since last December, the Division has conducted 42 operations in 11 different provinces. Its area of responsibility has expanded to the point that it now stretches about 275 kilometers from the double canopy jungle in the east to the paddies of the Mekong Delta in the west. The area covers over 12,000 square kilometers including 1,610 hamlets and a population of 1,552,825.
     At the outset, much of this area was under VC control, or was sharply contested by them. There was little security along the roads, and less in the countryside. VC main force units moved freely through the area, frequently parading through village streets. Our base camps were harassed, and our units came in contact nearly every time they moved out of the gates.
     As the Division got to work, the situation began to change. Large scale strike operations were successful in locating and engaging major VC main force units. Smaller scale operations were targeted against VC local force units. Squad and platoon size raids and ambushes were directed against guerrillas and infrastructure. In a year, the Division killed or detained over 5,000 of the enemy, captured tons of his supplies and equipment, and destroyed thousands of his bunkers, trenches and tunnels deep in his base areas. Most of the combat operations were in close coordination and cooperation with GVN forces, which in many instances shared the heaviest fighting and contributed significantly to the results achieved.
     In the eastern part of our area, the 1st Brigade—our jungle fighters—ranged from Phouc Tuy Province on the South China Sea to Tay Ninh Province along the Cambodian Border. Its operations, from JUNCTION CITY to SANTA FE, have improved the security in six provinces, with the greatest impact in Bien Hoa. For example, a year ago, armed escort was required day or night for traffic on Highway 15. Gradually it has been turned from "red" to "green," which means that traffic can flow freely on it during daylight hours with little danger of enemy incident. The Binh Son rubber Plantation has ceased to be VC controlled. A large VC base area has been opened up and is no longer a sanctuary for the enemy. We consistently operate long range patrols in an area into which we dared not venture with less than three battalions a year ago. Operations have also opened extensive portions of National Highways 1, 2, and 20. The enemy has been denied the May Tao Secret Zone as a safe  haven, and has been forced  to

shift his bases. Recent evidence indicates he has been forced to withdraw almost the entire 5th Division from this vast area.
     In the western portion of the Division area, the 2d and 3d Brigades moved into the Mekong Delta as the first major units to conduct sustained operations in that important region. After initial operations in the jungles of Nhon Trach and the mangrove swamps of the Rung Sat Special Zone, the 2d Brigade went afloat with the Mobile Riverine Force, pioneering riverine operations with the Navy's Task Force 117. Strike operations by the 2d Brigade in Long An, Go Cong, Dinh Tuong, and Kien Hoa Provinces broke up the 5th VC Nha Be Battalion, reduced the VC 514th Battalion to less than half strength, and dealt severe blows to the VC 263d Battalion. These operations permitted the opening of Highway 5, to include the Cau Noi Ferry which I've mentioned before. They also contributed to the security of Highway 4 which is the main overland artery into the Delta, even during the election periods when the VC vowed to cut it permanently.
     Meanwhile, the 3d Brigade has concentrated on Long An Province, which is the key to access to the Delta. A year ago, the roads were cut, the district capitals isolated, the countryside largely abandoned to the VC who moved freely to dominate the rural population. Since February, when the 3d Brigade began Operation ENTERPRISE, the situation has changed remarkably. At first, operations were directed against VC Main Force units. The VC 2d Independent Battalion was dispersed and the VC 506th Battalion, badly mauled, was forced to withdraw into the Plain of Reeds. Then followed operations against VC local force units and guerrillas, together with an intensive engineering effort to improve communications. The results have to be seen to be believed—roads and waterways opened, deserted villages reoccupied, VC-controlled hamlets reverting to GVN control, thousands of acres of land put back into producing rice, and commercial fishing underway once again. The Province is on its way back to its feet, the key to the Delta in friendly hands once again.
     Other units share the credit. The 11th Armored Cavalry "Blackhorse" Regiment, in the eastern jungle, the Royal Thai Army Volunteers "Queen's Cobra" Regiment in the Nhon Trach, the many Army of Vietnam, Regional Force, and Popular Force units—all, working together—have contributed to this success. The same must be said of all the other units of the Division which have provided the essential combat support and combat services support to make those operations possible.
     I am proud of what the "Old Reliables" have done in the past year. From a new, green organization, the Division has become a seasoned fighting team. It has tackled every task with confidence and professional skill which have paid off in results attained. It has a fine reputation. It has been called "the best division in Vietnam". It is. And I am proud to command it.

MG George G. O'Connor

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Commander's call begins the chain of events
PSYOPs officer prepares text  for pressmen

. Pressman makes final adjustments
High-speed presses print paper bombs

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The Battle of

     The glow of tracers from a Viet Cong machine gun illuminated the last hour of Palm Sunday March 19, 1967, as the Battle of Bau Bang erupted in what was to be a furious six-hour ordeal.
     By sunrise, 230 bodies from the 273rd Viet Cong Main Force Regiment would cover the pockmarked, brass-laden battlefield.
     Three missions were assigned to the 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry, 9th Infantry Division: Clear and secure highway 13 from Lai Khe to Cau Xe Lu's Suoi Than, secure the artillery base near Ap Bau Bang, and prepare for commitment as a reaction force in the 1st Brigade's area of operation.
     For these tasks the 3rd/5th was attached to the 1st Brigade, participating in Phase II of Operation JUNCTION CITY, a security mission along Highway 13.
     Troop A, 3rd/5th, was to secure Combat Outpost 3 and the fire support base where Battery B, 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery was deployed. Troop B, 3rd/5th was to defend troop base, Combat Outposts 1 and 2 as well as

Observation Posts 1, 2 and 3. Troop C, 3rd/5th would occupy the troop base. Headquarters troop would man the Squadron Command Post; and occupy Combat Outpost 4, augmented by two tanks from Troop A.
     By 7 p.m. all elements of the Squadron had occupied their assigned defensive positions and outposts. As the elements of Combat Outpost 4 were closing into position, a Viet Cong guerilla was killed attempting to place a large anti-tank mine in the road. Having compromised their position, the unit returned to the Squadron Command Post, and Troop A's tanks returned to the fire support base.
     At 11 p.m. 15 cattle were observed northeast of Troop A's  perimeter at the fire support base. Sergeant Michael Rorie, Marshville, N.C., was being relieved from guard when he heard bells and saw cattle cross the road in front of his armored cavalry assault vehicle (ACAV). Moments later, an enemy machine gun opened up. The driver immediately returned fire and together with a tank's main gun, destroyed the position.

     As soon as tactical air support became available, the jet aircraft showered the dug-in Viet Cong positions with rockets, cluster bomb units and 500-pound ordnance. Twenty six accurate sorties broke the back of the enemy pressing from the southeast. By 3:15 a.m. the battle area was cleared to a depth of 800 meters around the perimeter, allowing the most seriously wounded to be dusted off.
     The Air Force continued to strafe the area as the cavalrymen began a series of counterattacks from the perimeter, pushing through and destroying "Charlie."
     Each enemy probe, apparently to recover weapons and bodies, was met by a violent counterattack. About 5:30 a.m.

ammunition for the cavalrymen had become critical. They had expended most of their basic load and even the honeycombs in the hull had been drained of their precious nectar, the main gun rounds.
     As night became day, the count began. In the boiling wake of a six-hour firefight, the Viet Cong broke contact and withdrew. The 273d Viet Cong Main Force Regiment, an estimated 1,000 strong, had suffered a staggering defeat in their clash with the 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry.
     The superiority of the cavalry troopers was firmly established. They sustained only four killed in action and 67 wounded in leading the 9th Infantry Division through its first major victory in Vietnam.